De Beers Should Trust Its Name

On the eve of Anglo American's divestment from De Beers, a discussion has re-emerged over the company’s brand equity. How much of De Beers’ value lies in its name or intellectual property, such as A Diamond Is Forever? Is De Beers a brand, and how can its new owners best leverage that identity?

It is not a new debate, but a lingering one that inevitably shines a light on the company’s retail business, now known as De Beers London.

The latest discussion was sparked during an episode of The Diamond Dudes podcast, when my co-host, Rob Bates, asked what De Beers stands for. I argued that the association between De Beers and diamonds remains exceptionally strong, and that public perception of the company, and by extension diamonds themselves, tends to be more positive than negative.

The discussion continued well beyond the podcast, generating lively debate on Rob’s The Jewelry Wire WhatsApp community and on LinkedIn. In a column this week, ‘Can De Beers Name Sell Diamonds,’ Rob expanded on the discussion, explaining why he is “skeptical” that De Beers should focus on strengthening its brand equity.

His argument rests on four main points: not all perceptions of the company are favorable; the track record of its retail business has not been great; being a household name does not necessarily make it a consumer brand; and De Beers’ efforts to establish branded diamonds through initiatives such as Forevermark have had limited success.

Brand vs. Retail

My view is that the discussion requires a clear distinction between De Beers’ retail operation and its diamond branding initiatives, such as Forevermark, which remains active in India, and Origin, which the company recently launched in the US.

De Beers effectively acknowledged the shortcomings of Forevermark by discontinuing it in most markets. Origin is too new to judge. It focuses on the provenance of natural diamonds and, perhaps most importantly, employs a different distribution model than Forevermark.

Regardless of those branding efforts, the debate over whether the De Beers name has commercial value lies with its retail business.

De Beers London is where the company sells jewelry, not diamonds. That is an important distinction because it presents an entirely different value proposition.

Can De Beers London establish itself as a luxury jewelry house alongside Cartier, Van Cleef & Arpels, Harry Winston and Boucheron? Why has the business not been profitable since its inception? And perhaps most importantly, how do consumers actually perceive the De Beers name?

I believe perceptions of De Beers skew more positive today because its audience has changed. We are now roughly a generation and a half removed from Blood Diamond and from the company’s decision to end its category marketing efforts, which it only resumed last year.

The consequence is that an entire generation grew up without repeated exposure to the message that “A Diamond Is Forever.” At the same time, many younger consumers were also not exposed to the industry’s more controversial past.

During that period, however, the industry, led in many respects by De Beers and supported by a far stronger regulatory environment, made significant progress in compliance and environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards.

That, too, is a form of category marketing. While it does not promote the emotional appeal of diamonds, it reinforces the industry's credibility and, in doing so, strengthens the value of diamonds and the reputation of De Beers among a new generation of consumers.   

An Identity Crisis

Meanwhile, over the past two decades, De Beers’ identity has gone through multiple iterations, splintering the brand across its various businesses. Alongside the De Beers Group corporate entity were names such as the Diamond Trading Company for contract rough sales, Diamdel for auctions and Ignite for technology, among others.

The company eventually brought those businesses under a unified De Beers identity. Forevermark became De Beers Forevermark, Ignite became the De Beers Institute of Diamonds, and the company placed the De Beers name at the center of its corporate structure.

The retail business, however, followed a different path.

It suffered from something of an identity crisis from the outset. The joint venture between LVMH and De Beers was an uneasy marriage, one that always seemed destined to end in divorce, with both parents appearing guilty of absenteeism.

Yet De Beers could never abandon the business that carried its name. Nor should it. The retailer evolved from De Beers Diamond Jewellers to De Beers Jewellers, notably dropping “Diamond,” perhaps to distinguish the brand from Forevermark, or simply to reflect that it sold jewelry. It then underwent a more comprehensive rebrand as De Beers London in early 2025.

So why is the company reluctant to simply call the retailer De Beers? My instinct is that the name does evoke sophistication and desirability, even if it lacks the glamor and x factor of other luxury jewelry houses. Adding “London” arguably dilutes that association, particularly among consumers in the world’s other luxury capitals.

From this armchair critic’s perspective, De Beers (London) needs to take more risks, both in its product offering and in its messaging, which still feels rooted in the company's old advertising playbook.

Of course, this discussion comes as Anglo American nears the sale of its 85% stake in De Beers.

The value of that transaction will not be determined by the retail business or the company’s brand equity. Those are ancillary to the mining and rough diamond operations, which generate around 85% of De Beers’ revenue. As I stressed on the podcast, restoring the profitability and competitiveness of those businesses will be the new owners’ immediate priority.

Even so, they will almost certainly take a hard look at the retail operation after decades of losses. Maintaining the status quo is unlikely to be an option. They could close the business altogether, outsource it, or reshape it into a leaner and more focused luxury retailer.

The Retail Opportunity

I believe the retail business remains important to De Beers’ long-term future because brand equity will become increasingly important as rough diamond production declines over the coming decades. That can’t be built through mining or category marketing.

Besides, De Beers’ past failures in retail do not negate its potential. The path to making the retail operation viable, in my view, is not expansion but concentration.

With around 40 stores today, De Beers should focus on a very select group of global luxury destinations, close underperforming stores on the periphery, of which I suspect there are many, and concentrate on the highest-value segment of the market.

That strategy would reduce costs, create a more manageable retail network, and strengthen the sense of exclusivity management says it wants the brand to represent. It would also reinforce the positioning of both De Beers and natural diamonds as true luxury products.

Because if diamonds are rare, and De Beers has such a strong association with diamonds, the retail experience it provides should be rare too.

Image: De Beers London Old Bond Street store. (De Beers)